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1 Introduction
When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, informal relations
with stakeholders and social activists can turn into a powerful entrenchment strategy for
incumbent CEOs. This is particularly true in countries and periods where social activism,
political lobbying and media campaigns have the power to promote or disgrace top executives
of large corporations. 1 Inefficient managers have then a special motive for committing
themselves to a socially responsible behavior that gains stakeholders’ support. Explicit
stakeholder protection - whether enforced by the law or by a mutually agreed contract
between a firm’s shareholders and its stakeholders - can break this implicit pact, thus favoring
control contestability and managerial turnover.
We propose a simple model where stakeholders other than shareholders 2 can affect the
likelihood of CEO replacement, and incumbent CEOs can commit themselves (and not their
firm) to a stakeholder-friendly behavior. This subtle self-entrenchment strategy becomes
more appealing to CEOs when corporate law and the firm’s charter promote independent
boards, proxy fights and hostile takeovers. As to stakeholders, when deciding whether to
support the incumbent CEO, they trade off the cost of a less talented manager against
the benefit of managerial concessions. The latter are less valuable if stakeholders expect to
receive a fair treatment independently of who runs the firm. Within this framework, we
show the following four facts. First, when private benefits of control are high and stake-
holder activism is effective, corporate governance reforms aimed at enhancing managerial
turnover should be accompanied by an increase in explicit stakeholder protection. If not,
they may simply spur more managerial concessions to stakeholders. Second, shareholder
value may often be enhanced by the introduction of stakeholder protection rules that crowd
out managerial concessions and make corporate officers less entrenched. Third, although
stakeholders may support an inefficient CEO committed to a socially responsible behavior
against an alternative manager, stakeholder welfare is always increasing in the degree of
1It is widely recognized that stakeholders enjoy substantial effective control on firms by the threat of
costly boycotts and media campaigns (see Baron 2001, Feddersen and Gilligan 2000 and John and Klein
2001). In particular, social activists, local communities and unions often act as “white squires” to block
hostile takeovers. The Krupp-Thyssen case reported by Hellwig (2000) provides an example of workers as
successful white squires. The interference of other social activists in takeover contests is documented by
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1998), who comment on the environmentalist campaign set up against she 1986
hostile takeover of MAXXAM over Pacific Lumber Company.
2Namely, workers, consumers, local communities and potential pollutees. Although most of the literature
has focussed on the relationship between firms and workers (see Blair, 1995, Blair and Roe, 1999, and
Hansmann, 1996), the debate on the stakeholder society concept has unveiled the importance of other
constituencies as well.
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control contestability. This is because CEOs who can rely on anti-takeover defenses and
dominated boards do not need stakeholders’ support to buttress their positions. Finally,
CEOs are always opposed to any institutionalization of stakeholder protection which would
deprive them of their grip on stakeholders.
Our work is motivated by a recent trend whereby social and environmental activists and
shareholders are growing increasingly supportive of each other’s agendas, as corroborated by
the following stylized facts:
Shareholders’ recognition of stakeholders’ rights.
Mainstream shareholder activists and institutional investors are asking firms to produce
timely information on environmental and social performance and even to link executive com-
pensation to these measures. The Corporate Sunshine Working Group, an alliance between
institutional investors, environmental organizations, unions and public interest groups, is
asking the SEC to expand corporate social and environmental disclosure requirements. As
reported by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), resolutions filed by so-
cially responsible shareholders are often endorsed by institutional shareholders that have
long been associated with shareholder-value enhancing activism, like CalPERS. 3 There are
even cases where social activists and minority shareholders have shared the costs of resolu-
tions and proxy fights to improve the firms’ corporate governance and its commitment to
stakeholders. 4
Social activists’ interest for corporate governance issues.
Social and environmental activists are more and more involved in the corporate gov-
ernance debate. Many activists have in fact joined forces with shareholders’ lobbies to
campaign against anti-takeover legislation, CEO-dominated boards and lenient auditors, is-
sues that used to be well beyond the traditional social activism program. Business Ethics, a
well-known publication on socially responsible business, ranks first the need for independent
3Activists are increasingly exploiting standard corporate governance tools (e.g., shareholder resolutions
and proxy contests) to commit firms to a socially responsible behavior. As recently reported by The
Economist (May the 10th, 2001) “Shareholder activism is not new. But the issues being put to the vote [at
firms’ annual meetings] are moving beyond corporate governance towards questions of social, environmental
and ethical behaviour.” For interesting evidence on shareholder activism on social issues, see IRRC (2000).
4A case in point is represented by the unusual proxy fight set up in 1999 against Charles Hurwitz, the
C.E.O. of Maxxam Corporation, accused of breach of fiduciary duty by shareholders, and held responsible
for Maxxam’s 128 violations of environmental regulation and costly labor disputes. The fight was aimed at
imposing an independent board of directors at Maxxam (with one director being a leading consumer rights
advocate), and it was simultaneously supported by mainstream shareholder activists like CalPERS, by the
Rose Foundation for the Communities and the Environment, and the United Steelworkers of America, all
holding minority shares in the firm.
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auditors within its list of guidelines to reform US corporations. In a note dedicated to the
use of shareholder resolutions by NGOs as a tool of pressure on corporations, Friends of
the Earth reports that “socially-oriented shareholders often link social issues to corporate
governance issues.” The Rose Foundation for the Communities and the Environment has
recently used its shareholdings in corporations to pressure in favor of social responsibility,
but also for more independent boards. 5
General contempt for corporate malpractices.
Recent corporate scandals have raised awareness among all constituencies that ill-managed
corporations harm both their shareholders and other stakeholders at large. It is widely be-
lieved that Enron CEOs’ did not only breach their fiduciary duty towards shareholders by
misreporting earnings; they also deceived communities and workers by manipulating energy
prices in California and getting rid of their shares right before the company collapsed. These
considerations suggest that shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests may be more congruent
than received wisdom holds, to the extent that both have a common interest in favoring
better management of corporations.
The paper contributes to the current debate on the stakeholder society (see Hellwig,
2000 and Tirole, 2001), trying to assess who has an interest in endorsing a stakeholder
society concept, whereby managers are intended to have a multiple mission of aiming at
both shareholder value and stakeholder welfare. We wonder whether both stakeholders
and shareholders may not be better off when managers are bound to maximize shareholder
value, while clear covenants restricting the firms’ set of actions are established either by firm
charters or by the law to rule out actions that may impose large negative externalities on
stakeholders. Tirole (2001) argues that putting in place managerial incentives and control
structures that implement the stakeholder society concept may be very costly. Our paper
shows that the decision not to institutionalize stakeholder protection may prove even costlier,
leaving managers with the monopoly of relationships with stakeholders. In other words, the
lack of rules on corporate behavior is not always a synonymous for firm profitability and
shareholder value; often, it is only an excuse for managerial discretion.
Our work is related to Pagano and Volpin (2002a), who analyze the behavior of incum-
bent managers and workers in a firm faced with a hostile takeover threat, and argue that
incumbents are “natural allies” of workers: the former have an interest in offering long-term
contracts to workers so as to discourage the takeover, while the latter are likely to support
a lazy manager prone to low monitoring against a more efficient raider. In their paper,
5See respectively http://www.business-ethics.com, http://www.foe.org, http://www.rosefdn.org
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managerial effort is instrumental to reducing workers’ wages, hence takeover gains occur
via a reduction in stakeholder welfare. In Pagano and Volpin (2001) this has two natural
implications. First, workers are always opposed to rules favoring control contestability. Sec-
ond, incumbent managers can only gain (and shareholders lose) by an institutionalization of
employment protection, to the extent that long term labor contracts can be used as poison
pills to deter takeovers. We derive opposite predictions in a model where raiders increase
the corporate pie rather than simply redistribute it from stakeholders to shareholders. 6 In-
deed, it is this feature of our model that leaves room for a “congruence of interests” between
shareholders and stakeholders over the security of managerial jobs and the formal protection
of stakeholders.
The paper is related to the recent literature on the political economy of corporate gov-
ernance (see Pagano and Volpin, 2002b and Perotti and von Thadden, 2002 for the relevant
references), to the extent that its results can be applied to a political economy framework to
study how corporate governance and stakeholder protection laws are simultaneously deter-
mined. Our results also relate to the well-known Porter hypothesis (see Porter and van der
Linde, 1995) that environmental regulation enhances innovation. This conjecture has been
recently formalized in a mechanism design model by Ambec and Barla (2001), who argue
that environmental regulation reduces agency costs. Notice that while their work relies on
the crucial assumption that more polluting technologies are also costlier, we argue that en-
vironmental regulation may benefit shareholders even in cases where polluting technologies
are more profitable.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic model. We rule out
potential collusion between incumbent managers and stakeholders, and study how share-
holder value and stakeholder welfare are affected by stakeholder protection and corporate
governance. In section 3, we assume that incumbent managers can commit to a stakeholder-
friendly behavior, in order to obtain stakeholders’ support against a replacement attempt.
We study under which conditions an implicit agreement between managers and stakehold-
ers arises. In section 4, we analyze shareholders’, stakeholders’ and incumbent managers’
preferences over corporate governance and explicit stakeholder protection. In section 5 we
briefly discuss two applications of our result.
6Whether takeovers can only create value by reducing stakeholder welfare is largely an empirical question:
while evidence on the effects on the wage bill is mixed (see Becker, 1995 and Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny,
1990, but also Jarrell, Brickley and Jeffry, 1988 and Rosett, 1990) casual observations suggest that hostile
takeovers may well benefit natural stakeholders like consumers and potential pollutees. See also footnote 12.
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2 The model
Consider a firm run by a manager (I) enjoying a large private benefit of control γ from
running the firm. A fraction of shares α is held by the manager, while (1 − α) shares
are dispersed among small shareholders (SH). Dispersed shareholders have no control over
the firm’s course of action. The firm generates both a monetary profit, which accrues to
its owners, and a non-monetary externality on its other stakeholders (ST). We may think
of natural stakeholders like potential pollutees and environmentalists, customers or local
communities. Stakeholders derive no utility from money. All agents in the model are risk-
neutral.
Projects
The firm’s manager can either run the status quo project, or try to improve on it by
discovering a new project. The status quo project (project zero) is highly disliked by both
shareholders and stakeholders, in that it yields no profits and no private benefits to stake-
holders. There are also N a priori identical projects, k ∈ {1, 2, ...., N}, which yield a verifiable
monetary profit R with probability p + τk (and zero with probability (1 − p − τk)), and a
non-verifiable private benefit to stakeholders Bk. It is known that (N−2) projects are worse
than project 0 for both SH and ST, and that at least one of them has disastrous consequences
for both. The only two “relevant projects” generate the following expected monetary payoffs
to shareholders and externalities on stakeholders:
1 2 probability
(p+ τ)R,B pR, 0 λ
(p+ τ)R, 0 pR,B 1− λ
The shareholder’s preferred project succeeds with probability p + τ ; the stakeholders’
preferred project exerts a positive externality B on stakeholders. B can be thought of as
the foregone pollution with respect to the status quo project, the value of preserved em-
ployment for a local community, or the value of additional product safety for consumers.
With probability λ the shareholders’ and the stakeholders’ preferred projects coincide; with
probability (1−λ), the shareholder’s preferred project yields no private benefit to stakehold-
ers, while the stakeholder’s preferred project only succeeds with probability p. We assume
that λ belongs to (0, 1). λ measures the congruence of interests between shareholders and
stakeholders; alternatively, (1 − λ) captures the trade off between profit maximization and
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social/environmental objectives.7
Managerial talent
The payoffs attached to new projects are unknown unless further investigation is carried
out by the firm’s CEO. A manager i learns the new projects’ payoffs with probability θi, in
which case she selects one. With probability (1− θi), the manager does not learn anything;
hence, she optimally decides to run the status quo project. We define θi to be the managerial
talent for innovation. The incumbent CEO has talent θI . A better alternative manager, with
talent θR > θI is known to exist. However, she still has to be identified in the managerial
labor market.
CEO replacement attempts
We assume that with probability pi ∈ (0, 1) the board of directors or a coalition of
shareholders identifies the alternative manager (or else, the latter realizes that it can improve
the firm’s value and launches a hostile takeover on the firm). pi thus represents the extent
of effective competition in the managerial labor market, both at the firm level and at the
economy-wide level. pi is likely to be high when corporate law and the firm’s charter promote
independent boards and proxy fights, and when anti-takeover defenses are not allowed.
Stakeholder activism
When a replacement attempt occurs, stakeholder representatives such as social and en-
vironmental activists or local communities may side with the incumbent CEO to make sure
that she is not replaced. Activists dispose of powerful tools in this respect: they may start a
media campaign and even threaten a boycott in case the replacement occurs; alternatively,
by exerting pressure on political leaders to back their cause, they can create an adverse polit-
ical climate to the proxy fight or the takeover (Hellwig, 2000). 8 If undertaken, a stakeholder
campaign succeeds with probability a in deterring CEO replacement, where a ∈ (0, 1), and
fails with probability (1− a). 9 We assume that a stakeholder campaign is costless; the cost
of campaigning could be taken into account in the model without changing its qualitative
results.
7This modeling choice follows Aghion and Tirole (1997)’s lines in capturing the idea that parties in a
relationship may have a partial congruence of interests over the course of action to be taken.
8Hellwig (2000) argues that organized stakeholders like unions and local communities often act as “white
squires” to block hostile takeovers. In recent years, intense media campaigns against corporate takeovers
have been led by social and environmental activists. See for instance DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1998) for a
report on the environmentalist campaign against the 1986 hostile takeover of Maxxam over Pacific Lumber
Company.
9For the sake of simplicity, we assume that stakeholders do not choose the intensity of the campaigning
activity, but only whether to campaign or not, hence a is an exogenous parameter.
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Formal stakeholder protection
The firm’s choice of a course of action may be constrained by stakeholder protection
rules. We model this by assuming that - once projects are discovered - with probability
xr the manager is obliged to pick the project yielding B to stakeholders, independently of
whether this maximizes profits. This assumption has two interpretations. (a) Legal Stake-
holder Protection – A regulatory agency with the unique objective of maximizing stakeholder
welfare, and deriving no utility from money, has the formal right to make binding recom-
mendations over the choice of projects (for instance, it may rule out projects requiring a
polluting production process or impose a minimal standard of safety for consumers and
workers). However, it effectively exerts this right only if it is informed about the projects’
payoffs,10 which happens with probability xr ∈ (0, 1). We think of xr as being inversely
correlated to the authority’s degree of overload, and directly related to the quality of its
staff and the resources on which it can draw to pursue its investigations and enforce its de-
cisions.11 (b) Contractual Stakeholder Protection – A mutually agreed contract between the
firm’s owners and its stakeholders includes covenants ruling out projects that yield very low
outcomes to stakeholders (i.e., Bk = 0). The extent to which these covenants are enforced
(xr) depends in turn on the amount of hard information that the firm is obliged to disclose to
stakeholder representatives. Firms’ agreements with NGOs and so-called “ethic indexes” to
comply with a minimal level of environmental performance and labor safety, and to produce
reliable information on these dimensions, are an example of such covenants.
Timing
The timing of events is described in figure 1. At t = 1, with probability pi an alternative
manager challenges the incumbent CEO. If so, stakeholders may campaign and threaten a
boycott against the potential new management. The campaign succeeds with probability
a. At t = 2, the manager who is in control learns the payoffs and selects a new project
with probability θi (i = I, R). If stakeholder protection rules or covenants are enforced, the
manager has to comply with them; otherwise, she is free to choose her most favored project.
At t = 3, monetary payoffs accrue to shareholders and the manager (who also enjoys the
10This descends from the assumptions that some projects yield a negative payoff to stakeholders, and that
projects all look alike ex-ante.
11This is a reasonable description of what determines the extent of regulatory agencies’ interference in firms’
activity. For instance, environmental activists consider the Environmental Protection Agency’s budget as a
crucial variable to be monitored. Friends of the Earth, a well-known US environmentalists organization, has
recently stressed how the Bush administration’s cuts to the EPA budget may damage EPA’s ability to make
and enforce recommendations and environmental laws. Among all budget cuts, the most criticized are those
to the Office of Science and Technology, which provides scientific backbone to EPA’s regulatory decisions
and actions, and those to EPA’s enforcement office (see http://www.foe.org).
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private benefit of control γ), while stakeholders enjoy the private benefits generated by the
firm’s activity. In section 3, we will assume that at an initial date t = 0 the incumbent
CEO can make a personal investment to credibly commit herself to a “stakeholder-friendly”
behavior, so as to establish a privileged relationship with powerful stakeholder activists.
Figure 1: The timeline
-0
(Incumbent CEO
invests in stake-
holder relation.)
1
Replacement attempt
(probability pi). Stake-
holders campaign or
not
2
Controlling manager
learns payoffs and picks
project with prob. θi,
complies with regulation
with prob. xr; with
prob. 1 − θi implements
the status quo.
3
Pay-offs accrue.
2.1 The benchmark: no managerial entrenchment
In this section we analyze the impact of the quality of corporate governance rules favoring
managerial turnover (pi) and the extent of formal stakeholder protection (xr) on shareholder
value, stakeholder welfare and the incumbent’s rents, when incumbent CEOs cannot entrench
themselves at t = 0.
In this benchmark case, at t = 2, whenever free from the regulatory interference, any
manager chooses the project which maximizes equity value. As the incumbent manager is
not more lenient to favor stakeholders than a raider is, ceteris paribus, stakeholders benefit
when the more efficient manager takes over:
θR [xrB + (1− xr)λB] > θI [xrB + (1− xr)λB] .
Hence, they optimally decide not to support the incumbent CEO at t = 1. Given this,
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shareholder value is:
VSH(pi, xr) =
= piθR [xr(p+ λτ) + (1− xr)(p+ τ)]R + (1− pi)θI [xr(p+ λτ) + (1− xr)(p+ τ)]R
= [θI + pi(θR − θI)] [p+ τ − (1− λ)τxr]R,
where expected project returns under the relevant regulatory constraints are multiplied by
the average managerial quality. Stakeholder welfare also depends on project choice and
average managerial quality:
WST (pi, xr) = piθR [xr + (1− xr)λ]B + (1− pi)θI [xr + (1− xr)λ]B (1)
= [θI + pi(θR − θI)] [λ+ (1− λ)xr]B.
Finally, the incumbent manager’s utility is:
UI(pi, xr) = (1− pi) [γ + θI (p+ τ − (1− λ)τxr)αR] + piθR (p+ τ − (1− λ)τxr)αR
= θR (p+ τ − (1− λ)τxr)αR + (1− pi) [γ −∆θ (p+ τ − (1− λ)τxr)αR] .
An incumbent CEO with a high enough stake might be better off when she is replaced, to
the extent that the additional value of her stake offsets the lost benefits of control. Here,
however, we focus on CEOs whose private benefits of control are sufficiently large relative to
their equity stake that they always want to stay on (i.e., γ > ∆θ (p+ τ − (1− λ)τ)αR). This
implies that low-talented incumbent CEOs are always opposed to good corporate governance.
In table 1 we display the preferences of each type of agent (stakeholders, shareholders,
and the incumbent CEO) with respect to corporate governance rules reducing the security
of managerial jobs and to formal stakeholder protection:
Table 1: Effect of an increase in pi and xr on agents’ utilities
pi xr
ST + +
SH + −
I − −
Notice that while shareholders and stakeholders have dissonant preferences over the ex-
tent of stakeholder protection, they both are better off under a tighter corporate governance
regime. Indeed - although their views may differ on which is the best project to adopt - both
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stakeholders and shareholders have a common interest in enhancing managerial turnover.
The reason for this is that shareholder value need not necessarily be created at the expense of
stakeholder welfare; indeed, it is often the case that more efficient and innovative managers,
by increasing the size of the corporate pie, benefit both shareholders and stakeholders. 12
In this “first best” scenario, shareholder value is maximized when pi and xr are respec-
tively close to 1 and 0, that is, when the quality of corporate governance is high while
stakeholder protection is minimized. In what follows, we allow the incumbent CEO to make
binding commitments vis-a`-vis stakeholders, so that stakeholder activists will have an incen-
tive to campaign against the potential new manager. As we will see, this changes dramatically
shareholders’ preferences over corporate governance and stakeholder protection.
3 Stakeholder activism and managerial entrenchment
Under the existing corporate governance regime, the incumbent manager faces a probability
pi of being replaced. Hence, at t = 0 she may try to entrench herself by building a privileged
relationship with the firm’s stakeholders. There are several ways to achieve such a commit-
ment. The manager can make an early investment in “environmental human capital” so as
to gain expertise in implementing environmentally-friendly projects. 13 She can spend long
hours gathering the advice of, and building relationships with, NGO representatives, local
communities and environmentalists. More generally, she can develop a reputation for being
lenient to stakeholders’ requests.
We model this idea in the following way. Suppose that implementing any project k ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , N} imposes a private cost c on management. At t = 0, however, the incumbent
CEO can make an observable investment in expertise to reduce such a cost. In particular,
12 Indeed, although many hint at a “natural alliance” between stakeholders and inefficient CEOs (see for
instance Hellwig, 2000), to us it is not obvious that stakeholders need benefit from managerial inefficiency.
For instance, consumers may be better off when a more innovative manager takes over to improve the firm’s
products. Potential pollutees may well be more aligned to shareholders concerned with future environmental
liabilities, rather than to a myopic manager with poor incentives to invest in discovering green production
processes. For instance, and against common wisdom, hostile takeovers enhancing efficiency in the oil
industry have led to curtailment of excessive exploration. Probably, it is not managerial inefficiency per se
that pleases stakeholders; managerial concessions do.
13Investment in “green expertise” is becoming a fashionable strategy for many corporate officers. In an
interview with McKinsey consultants, the C.E.O. of Dow Chemical Company (a leader in the voluntary
adoption of environmentally-friendly strategies) stated that he allocates about 25 percent of his time to
handling environmental issues. He also reported on the firm’s dialogue with stakeholders: “[we created] a
panel for the corporation on a worldwide basis. It includes academics, environmentalists, a former EPA
director, (...) and it worked: we have learnt from the panel, and they have learnt from us.” (“What is
Environmental Strategy?”, The McKinsey Quarterly, 1993, 4: 53−68)
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she can invest xc at cost Kxc, and learn with probability xc how to implement stakeholder-
friendly projects yielding a private benefit B to stakeholders (e.g., projects requiring coop-
eration from the local community, pollution-free projects, etc.); in this case the private cost
of implementing such projects is reduced to zero. Investing in the relationship with stake-
holders and local communities requires time; hence, this investment is not feasible to outside
managers. We assume that K = c, which implies that the investment is never profitable
unless it is part of an entrenchment strategy. We also assume:
Assumption 1
ατR < c.
This assumption implies that when an investment xc is undertaken, with probability xc
the incumbent manager’s preferences are congruent with stakeholders’: the manager picks
the stakeholders’ favorite project even at the expense of monetary profits. With probability
(1−xc), the manager gains no expertise and her preferences are congruent with shareholders’;
hence, she only picks the stakeholders’ favorite project with probability λ. This directly
implies the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The degree of congruence between the incumbent manager’s and the stakehold-
ers’ objectives is measured by λ+(1−λ)xc; it increases from λ to 1 as the “stakeholder-specific
investment” xc is raised from 0 to 1.
xc thus measures the amount of managerial concessions to stakeholders. At t = 1,
stakeholders are willing to support the incumbent CEO provided xc satisfies the following
constraint:
θI(1− xr)(1− λ)Bxc ≥ (θR − θI) [λ+ (1− λ)xr]B
that is, the concessions to be expected under the incumbent management outweigh the cost
for stakeholders of bearing a less efficient manager. This constraint implies that managerial
concessions must lie above a threshold xc(xr). Notice that xc(xr) is increasing in xr: if
stakeholders’ interests are protected by regulation or by an explicit contractual agreement
between the stakeholders and the firm, then stakeholders are more hardly convinced to back
an inefficient CEO.
A self-entrenchment strategy whereby the CEO invests xc ≥ xc(xr) in stakeholder rela-
tionships is profitable if and only if:
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pia {γ − c− αR∆θ [(p+ τ)− (1− λ)τxr]} ≥
[1− pi(1− a)] [αRθI(1− xr)(1− λ)τ ]xc(xr) (2)
that is, the higher expected rents enjoyed by the incumbent CEO owing to self-entrenchment
outweigh the cost of the pro-stakeholder concessions. A first inspection of condition (2) allows
us to state the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The CEO’s incentives to self-entrench by establishing stakeholder relationships
are stronger the tougher is the replacement threat (the higher is pi) and the more effective
is stakeholder activism (i.e., a is large).
When good corporate governance deprives managers of standard tools to protect their
jobs (such as anti-takeover defenses and CEO-dominated boards) CEOs turn to subtler
ways to stay in power. As the effectiveness of social activists’ campaigns increases, building
a relationship with stakeholder representatives may become a powerful self-entrenchment
tool.
Let us define:
Γ ≡
(γ − c)
αR
,
which measures the relative importance of private benefits of control versus monetary
returns in the CEO’s objective function. This variable is of crucial importance to our results;
indeed, only when control benefits are large enough compared to the managerial equity stake,
is the CEO willing to resist a replacement, even undergoing the cost of pro-stakeholder
concessions. 14
The following lemma establishes how, for any intensity of the managerial replacement
threat, an appropriate level of stakeholder protection can counter the CEO’s entrenchment
strategy:
14One may argue that increasing the CEO’s equity stake α would eliminate the incumbent’s incentive to
resist a replacement. Hence, our results would depend on α being an exogenous variable in the model. Our
answer is that even if α was endogenous, it could still be too costly to discourage managerial entrenchment
by raising the CEO equity share. Notice that if large equity stakes were an effective, cheap instrument to
deter managerial entrenchment, we would not observe top executives pressuring against corporate governance
reforms that make control contestable, and engaging in creative self-entrenchment strategies, as we in fact
do. See also Shleifer and Vishny (1988) for a discussion of reasons why many top executives own relatively
little equity in the firms they run.
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Lemma 3 For any pi ∈ (0, 1), there exist Γo(pi), Γ1(pi) such that for Γo(pi) < Γ < Γ1(pi),
x̂r(pi) ∈ (0, 1) is the threshold level of stakeholder protection above which the incumbent
CEO’s entrenchment strategy becomes unprofitable. The threshold x̂r is increasing in pi and
Γ, and decreasing in ∆θ.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 2 depicts the function x̂r(pi) in the space (pi, xr). Above the x̂r(pi) locus, the incum-
bent CEO never invests in stakeholder relationships. This is either because poor corporate
governance rules (low pi) makes it easy for the CEO to preserve her job, or because explicit
stakeholder protection (xr high) makes stakeholders value less managerial concessions. In-
deed, when faced with a potential alliance with the incumbent management, stakeholders
trade off the benefit of managerial concessions against the cost of a less innovative manage-
ment: if they expect to receive a good treatment independently of who runs the firm, they
do not want to “strike” an implicit alliance with the incumbent CEO.
0
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Figure 2: The function x̂r.
Remark 1 The fact that the locus x̂r(pi) is increasing in pi suggests that when stakeholder
activism is very effective, corporate governance reforms aimed at enhancing managerial
turnover should be accompanied by an increase in explicit stakeholder protection. If not,
they may simply spur more managerial concessions and stakeholder activism.
14
Assume that pi and xr lie below the x̂r(pi) locus. Then the incumbent CEO commits to
a protection of stakeholders’ interests which goes beyond that to which the firm by itself is
committed.15 If the gains from this implicit alliance are evenly split between the CEO and
stakeholders, then the level of pro-stakeholder concessions x∗c equals the Nash bargaining
solution:
x∗c =
a∆θB(λ+ (1− λ)xr) + piaαR(Γ−∆θ(p+ τ − (1− λ)xrτ))
θI(1− xr)(1− λ)(aB + (1− pi(1− a))ταR)
.
Straightforward calculations show that (∂x∗c/∂pi) > 0, (∂x
∗
c/∂xr) > 0 and (∂x
∗
c/∂λ) > 0.
Intuitively, a tougher replacement threat (e.g., an independent board or a ban on anti-
takeover defenses) makes the incumbent manager more willing to relinquish concessions to
stakeholders in order to preserve control. The incumbent manager is also forced to larger
concessions when a larger degree of stakeholder protection improves stakeholders’ welfare
under the alternative manager.
4 Who benefits from good corporate governance and
explicit stakeholder protection
We now build on the previous section to analyze the impact of corporate governance reg-
ulation enhancing managerial turnover (pi), and of explicit stakeholder protection (xr), on
shareholder value, stakeholder welfare and CEOs’ rents. We argue that stakeholders and
shareholders may to some extent have congruent preferences over both issues.
4.1 Shareholder value, managerial replacement threats, and stake-
holder protection
In our model, small shareholders completely delegate control to managers, and an active
market for corporate control ensures that inefficient managers are replaced. If stakeholder
activism can impair the functioning of this market, incumbent CEOs have an incentive to
“bribe” stakeholders by committing to less efficient project choices. This potential alliance
changes dramatically shareholders’ preferences over corporate governance regulation and
legal stakeholder protection, as the following proposition shows.
15Corporate officers engaged to a socially responsible behavior insist on this voluntary compliance to an
“over-protection” of stakeholders’ interests. In a recent McKinsey report on environmental strategy, Dave
Buzzelli, vice-president of the Environment, Health and Safety department of Dow Chemical Co., claims that
“[Dow Chemical’s] responses [to environmental concerns] go beyond compliance with current mandates and
address global environmental issues on a proactive, voluntary basis.” (“What is Environmental Strategy?”,
The McKinsey Quarterly, 1993, 4: 53−68)
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Proposition 1 Suppose managerial entrenchment is to be countered. Then, if the incum-
bent’s control benefits are large (Γ > ∆θ(p + τ(1− λ))), shareholder value is concave in pi.
It is maximized when the managerial replacement threat is 0 < pi∗ << 1, and a minimal
level of formal protection x̂r(pi
∗) ∈ (0, 1) is provided to stakeholders. pi∗ is decreasing in Γ
and a.
Proof. See the appendix.
Notice that, in contrast with section 2.1, when managers can entrench themselves through
a stakeholder-friendly behavior shareholder value is a concave function of pi. Thus, share-
holders’ interests are best served when competition in the managerial labor market is not
too high (i.e. pi is strictly lower than 1). This is so as by lemma 3 countering managerial en-
trenchment when pi is high may prove very costly (i.e. require setting very strong stakeholder
protection rules).
The following two examples show that depending on parameter values shareholders have
two ways of countering managerial entrenchment. In the first example, where a and Γ are not
too large, a high level of legal stakeholder protection (i.e., xr “large”) can be associated to
a tough replacement threat (pi “large”), so that stakeholders are led to trust the alternative
manager. The cost imposed on profits by stakeholder protection is outweighed by the higher
expected managerial quality induced by managerial turnover. Notice that in example 1,
the corporate pie (inclusive of stakeholder welfare) is increased at the expense of incumbent
managers, though some shareholder value must be sacrificed to guarantee a minimal amount
of welfare to stakeholders.
The above solution may become very costly, however, when stakeholders campaigns are
very effective (a close to 1), and managers value much their private benefits of control (Γ
“large”), as in example 2. Indeed, stakeholders are easily lured by incumbent’s large conces-
sions. In such case, shareholder value is maximized by insulating CEOs from a replacement
threat (i.e., setting pi low) and giving poor formal protection to stakeholders. Incumbent
managers, who do not need stakeholders’ support to buttress their positions, make few
concessions to stakeholders; their preferences on projects are then more aligned with share-
holder value. 16 In example 2, shareholder value is preserved by leaving rents to incumbent
managers. Hence, the corporate pie (inclusive of stakeholder welfare) is reduced as average
managerial quality is lower, but shareholder value is increased at the expense of stakeholder
16The idea that boards may prevent inefficient entrenchment strategies simply by “granting the CEO some
insulation from competition for his job” has been often advanced in the corporate governance literature. See
for instance Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
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welfare.
Example 1 In figure 3 we set θI = .1, θR = .5, α = .5, p = .5, τ = .5, λ = .7, a = .4, B = 2
and Γ = 0.8. With these parameters pi∗ = 0.44 and x̂r(pi
∗) = 0.47 .
Example 2 In figure 4 we keep the same data of example 1 but assume that both the
stakeholder ability at affecting the replacement decision, and the incumbent control benefits
are higher (i.e. we set a = .8 and Γ = 2). In this case: pi∗ = 0.038 and x̂r(pi
∗) = 0.063.
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VSH(x
∗
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pi
Figure 3: The continuous (dotted) curve represents shareholder value when entrenchment is
(not) to be countered. Shareholders preempt entrenchment: pi∗ = 0.44 and x̂r(pi
∗) = 0.47.
Notice that in both examples shareholder value is indeed maximized by countering man-
agerial entrenchment (i.e., it is not optimal to set pi and xr below the x̂r(pi) locus). Therefore,
we can conclude:
Proposition 2 There is an open set of parameters for which shareholder value is maximized
by countering managerial entrenchment, and hence by providing a minimal level of explicit
stakeholder protection x̂r(pi
∗) > 0.
Remark 2 – Welfare effects – To be written.
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Figure 4: The continuous (dotted) curve represents shareholder value when entrenchment is
(not) to be countered. Shareholders preempt entrenchment: pi∗ = 0.038 and x̂r(pi
∗) = 0.063.
4.2 Stakeholder welfare and managerial job security
Stakeholders’ welfare function changes according to whether xr and pi lie below or above
the locus x̂r(pi). By lemma 3, whenever xr ≥ x̂r(pi), WST coincides with (1); hence, it
is increasing in xr as well as pi: stakeholders can only benefit from the replacement of an
inefficient manager. When instead xr < x̂r(pi), stakeholders’ welfare writes as:
WST (pi, xr) =
[θI + pi(1− a)(θR − θI)] [xr + (1− xr)λ]B + (1− pi(1− a))θI(1− xr)(1− λ)x
∗
c(pi, xr)B
which is also increasing in pi and xr. Notice that the additional term with respect to (1)
represents the benefit of managerial concessions: stakeholders now have a further motive
for endorsing corporate governance rules that enhance managerial turnover, to the extent
that the incumbent’s concessions are an increasing function of pi. Indeed, bad corporate
governance rules allowing anti-takeover defenses and staggered boards make CEOs less eager
to appeal to stakeholders, in that they do not need stakeholders’ support to buttress their
positions. This implies that even those stakeholders who would support incumbent CEOs in
return for concessions prefer the firm’s control to be contestable ex ante:
Corollary 1 Although stakeholder activists may want to side with the incumbent CEO at
t=1, their welfare is always increasing in the quality of corporate governance rules enhancing
18
managerial turnover.
Corollary 1 adds a further argument to The Economist ’s view on the use of anti-takeover
defenses: “...who benefits from such protection against outside bids? Not shareholders, who
lose their chance to vote on a change of management; and not employees or other stake-
holders, whose interests may be better served by a new and more dynamic ownership. The
only beneficiaries from obstacles to a market in corporate control are managers.” (“Takeover
Troubles,” January 31st, 2002). Our result rationalize the recent, surprising interest of social
and environmental activists for the corporate governance agenda. Many activists have in fact
joined forces with small shareholders’ lobbies to campaign against anti-takeover legislation,
CEO-dominated boards and lenient auditors.
4.3 CEOs
Interestingly, inefficient CEOs have the opposite view of corporate governance and stake-
holder protection rules. Indeed, lemma 3 implies the following result:
Corollary 2 The incumbent manager always benefits from a reduction in the intensity of
the replacement threat and from a reduction in explicit stakeholder protection.
That CEOs may be opposed to tough competition in the managerial labor market is
not surprising. Here we would rather stress that CEOs prone to make personal commit-
ments to stakeholder representatives (which is the case whenever xr < x̂r(pi)) are indeed op-
posed to welcome stakeholder-protection laws, or the introduction of explicit pro-stakeholder
covenants in the firm’s charter. This prediction is in line with casual evidence of managers
who profess concerns for corporate social responsibility, but are then reluctant to endorse
pro-stakeholder regulations and all “attempts to institutionalize considerations of stakeholder
interests in corporate governance” (see Hellwig, 2000). 17
5 Applications and discussion
5.1 The political economy of corporate governance and legal stake-
holder protection
Our results can be applied to a political economy framework where interest groups (share-
holders, incumbent managers and stakeholders) contribute to determine financial regulation
17Shleifer and Vishny (1989) informally argue that entrenchment objectives may explain why managers
try to make the firm’s contracts implicit rather than explicit.
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and legal stakeholder protection (e.g., labor protection, environmental regulation, antitrust
enforcement, etc.). We then predict that besides endorsing a better corporate governance
regime, small shareholders may want to support a minimal level of legal stakeholder protec-
tion to prevent the implicit agreement between inefficient managers and stakeholders. This
is likely to occur when stakeholders’ activism is effective but incumbent managers’ private
benefits of control are not too large (see example 1). In this case, shareholders’ preferences
over regulatory regimes are partially congruent with those of other stakeholders, in that
both endorse corporate governance rules favoring managerial turnover and explicit stake-
holder protection rules.18 We also predict that when instead stakeholder activism is very
effective and incumbent managers’ private benefits of control are very large, an “alliance”
between small shareholders and incumbent managers arises at a political level. Both groups
back corporate governance rules that leave CEOs’ positions unchallenged and poor stake-
holder legal protection, at the expense of stakeholder welfare. Such an alliance between
shareholders and incumbent managers seems to be prevailing in the Italian political scene
at the moment. On the one hand, neither labor nor environmental protection are a prior-
ity of the current legislature, as suggested by proposed reforms of the labor market and by
recent laws on environmental liabilities. 19 On the other hand, the security of managerial
jobs has definitely not been impaired by recently-approved laws reducing charges for creative
accounting practices.
5.2 The optimal design of a corporate charter
Our model can also help understand how stakeholders, shareholders and managers contribute
to write or modify a firm’s charter, whereby the organizational structure, the internal rules,
and the allocation of control rights determine the quality of its corporate governance and
the extent to which the firm commits to internalize stakeholder welfare.
Our results suggest that under some conditions, shareholders may want to pressure for a
formal incorporation of socially responsible aims in the corporate charter, rather than leave a
blank cheque to managers to promote shareholder value maximization or stakeholder protec-
tion at their convenience. This probably explains why some mainstream shareholder activists
and institutional investors, having surrendered to the concept of corporate social responsi-
18In this respect, it will be interesting to see whether a minimal legal protection of workers, consumers and
potential pollutees will still be enforced in case supporters of good corporate governance prevail in countries
like Germany and France.
19The former aimed at reducing workers’ guarantees against unjust dismissal, the latter substantially
loosening the regulation on hazardous wastes.
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bility, are now pressuring CEOs and boards to produce timely information on environmental
and social performance and to link executive compensation to these measures.
21
References
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997). Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. Journal of
Political Economy 105 (1), 1–29.
Ambec, S. and P. Barla (2001). A Theoretical Foundation of the Porter Hypothesis. Eco-
nomics Letters (Forthcoming).
Baron, D. (2001). Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strat-
egy. Research Paper n. 1656, Stanford Graduate School of Business .
Becker, B. (1995). Union Rents as a Source of Takeover Gains Among Target Shareholders.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review (49), 3–19.
Bhagat, S., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1990). Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: the Return
to Corporate Specialization. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics .
Blair, M. (1995). Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the
Twenty-First Century. Washington: Brookings Institution.
Blair, M. and M. J. Roe (1999). Employees and Corporate Governance. Washington:
Brookings Institution.
DeAngelo, H. and L. DeAngelo (1998). Ancient Redwood and the Politics of Finance:
the Hostile Takeover of the Pacific Lumber Company. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics (47), 3–53.
Feddersen, T. and T. Gilligan (2000). Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of
Credence Goods. Working paper, Northwestern University .
Hansmann, H. (1996). The Ownership of Enterprise. Harvard: Belknap.
Hellwig, M. (2000). On the Economics and Politics of Corporate Finance and Corporate
Control. In X. Vives (Ed.), Corporate Governance, pp. 95–134. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
IRRC (2000). Social Policy Resolutions in 2000: Issues, Votes and Views of Institutional
Investors. Technical report, IRRC.
Jarrell, G. A., J. Brickley, and N. Jeffry (1988, Winter). The Market for Corporate Control:
the Empirical Evidence Since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1), 49–68.
John, A. and J. Klein (2001). The Boycott Puzzle: Consumer Motivations for Sacrifice.
Working Paper, INSEAD .
22
Pagano, M. and P. Volpin (2001). The Political Economy of Corporate Governance. CEPR
Discussion Paper n. 2682 .
Pagano, M. and P. Volpin (2002a). Managers, Workers and Corporate Control. Unpub-
lished Manuscript, CSEF (Universita` di Salerno).
Pagano, M. and P. Volpin (2002b). The Political Economy of Finance. Oxford Economic
Policy Review (forthcoming).
Perotti, E. and E. von Thadden (2002). The Political Economy of Bank versus Market
Dominance. mimeo, University of Amsterdam and Universite´ de Lausanne.
Porter, M. E. and C. van der Linde (1995). Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (4), 97–118.
Rosett, J. G. (1990). Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? The
Evidence on Contract Wages. Journal of Financial Economics (27), 263–282.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1988, Winter). Value Maximization and the Acquisition
Process. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1), 7–20.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1989). Management Entrenchment. the Case of Manager-
Specific Investments. Journal of Financial Economics (25), 123–139.
Tirole, J. (2001). Corporate Governance. Econometrica 69, 1–35.
23
Appendix
Proof of lemma 3 Define x̂r(pi) as the level of environmental regulation such that (2) holds
as an equality:
x̂r(pi) =
[Γ−∆θ(p+ τ)] pia− λτ∆θ(1− pi(1− a))
(1− pi)(1− λ)τ
. (3)
Let ∆θ = θR−θI . By inspection of (3), x̂r(pi) < 1 if and only if Γ < Γ1(pi) ≡ ∆θ(p+τ(1+λ))+
(∆θτ(1−pi)/pia) and x̂r(pi) > 0 if and only if Γ > Γo(pi) ≡ (p+τ)∆θ+(∆θλτ(1−pi(1−a)))/pia.
Notice that since λ ∈ (0, 1), Γo(pi) < Γ1(pi).
Proof of proposition 1 Let H1 = ∆θ(p+ τ(1−λ)) and H2 = ∆θ(1−a)(p+ τ(1−λ))+aΓ
where ∆θ = θR−θI . If managerial entrenchment is to be countered, shareholder value writes
as
VSH(x̂r(pi)) =
(
θI + pi∆θ
∆θ(1− pi)
)
(H1 − piH2).
The first order condition for shareholder value maximization is given by
pi2∆θH2 − 2pi∆θH2 − (θIH2 − θRH1)
∆θ(1− pi)2
= 0.
Solving for pi∗ we obtain
pi∗1,2 = 1±
√
θRa(Γ−∆θ(p+ τ(1− λ)))
∆θ(aΓ +∆θ(1− a)(p+ τ(1− λ)))
,
if Γ < ∆θ(p + τ(1 − λ)), the discriminant is negative and V ′SH(pi) > 0, for all pi ∈ (0, 1).
In this case shareholders always want to set pi as close to 1 as possible. Conversely, if
Γ > ∆θ(p+ τ(1− λ)), the optimal level of corporate governance quality is given by
pi∗ = 1−
√
θRa(Γ−∆θ(p+ τ(1− λ)))
∆θ(aΓ +∆θ(1− a)(p+ τ(1− λ)))
.
Notice that pi∗ is decreasing both in a and Γ.
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